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ABSTRACT: A controversial part of the health reform debate is whether a new public insurance 
plan choice should be offered to the under-65 population. This report analyzes alternative paths to 
reform and presents estimates of impacts on health spending. The approaches include: 1) a public 
health plan paying providers at Medicare rates, offered alongside private plans in a national 
health insurance exchange; 2) a public plan paying providers at rates set midway between 
Medicare and private plan rates, offered alongside private plans in an insurance exchange; and  
3) no public plan, with only private plans offered to employers and individuals through an 
insurance exchange. All three approaches, if combined with Medicare payment and system 
reform, would produce substantial savings over time, but option 1 would yield the most— 
$3.0 trillion in cumulative health system savings over 2010 to 2020, compared with $2.0 trillion 
(option 2) and $1.2 trillion (option 3). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The U.S. health system is traveling down a fiscally dangerous road. By 2020, over 
one-fifth of the nation’s economic resources—21.3 percent of the gross domestic product 
(GDP)—will go toward providing health care without commensurate return in access, 
health outcomes, or value. In spite of all that spending, an estimated 61 million people will 
be uninsured in 2020, and more than 30 million more will be underinsured—at risk of 
incurring medical bills they cannot afford and accumulating debt for health care expenses. 
 
In February 2009, The Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance 
Health System proposed an integrated plan for putting the U.S. health system on the path 
to high performance, which would lead to better access, improved quality of care, and 
greater efficiency by 2020. Major features of this proposal include creation of a national 
insurance exchange that offers an affordable choice of private and public health insurance 
plans to all Americans; requirements that individuals obtain coverage and that employers 
help finance coverage for workers; promotion of more patient-centered, efficient, and 
integrated health care delivery through the use of innovative provider payment approaches; 
promulgation of health information technology and comparative-effectiveness research to 
improve quality and enhance value; and adoption of public health initiatives to reduce 
obesity and tobacco use and improve overall health and quality of life. 
 
National debate is currently centered on the question of how to slow the growth of 
health care costs to sustain coverage while ensuring quality of care. A controversial 
component of this debate is whether to offer a new public plan choice to the under-65 
population. This report by Commonwealth Fund staff is intended to inform this debate. It 
does so by analyzing alternative approaches to defining the role of a public plan and 
presenting estimates of the potential impacts of the approaches on health spending. These 
alternative paths to higher performance include: 
 
• Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates. This path includes a public health 
insurance plan that pays providers at Medicare rates and is offered alongside private 
plans within a national health insurance exchange. 
• Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates. This path includes a public 
insurance plan that pays providers at rates set midway between current Medicare and 
private plan rates and is offered alongside private plans in a national health insurance 
exchange—and subject to the same market rules as they are. 
 viii
• Private Plans. This path does not include a public plan option; it includes only  
private plans offered to employers and individuals through a national health  
insurance exchange. 
 
The analysis assumes that each of the three paths includes the same insurance 
market reforms to ensure participation and affordability, and that each includes the same 
Medicare payment reforms and broader health system reforms to align incentives with 
value and improve the outcomes and efficiency of the health care delivery system. The 
major features of the three alternatives are summarized in Exhibit ES-1. 
 
 
Exhibit ES-1. Policy Provisions Under Three Reform Scenarios
XXXComparative effectiveness
System Reform
XXXExpand Medicaid/CHIP
XXXHealth information technology
XXXPublic Health
Provider Payment Reform
Voluntary for
private plans
Required for public plan;
voluntary for private plans
Required for public plan;
voluntary for private plansPayment on value, not volume
Unchanged
Midpoint between Medicare and 
commercial level for public plan; 
commercial levels in private plans
Medicare level for public plan; 
commercial level for private plansCost restraints on provider prices
XXXMedicaid at Medicare rates
Bought in at 
commercial levelMost bought in at midpoint levelBought in at Medicare levelCoverage of the uninsured
Changes to Current Public Programs
XXXRetain current Medicare benefit structure
XXXEnd Medicare disability waiting period
XXXCommunity rating
XXXGuaranteed access and renewal
XXXMinimum benefit standard
XXXIncome-related premium assistance in exchange
XXXReplaces individual insurance market
PrivatePublic and privatePublic and privatePlans offered
Insurance Exchange
Insure workers or
pay 7% of earnings 
Insure workers or
pay 7% of earnings 
Insure workers or
pay 7% of earnings Employer shared responsibility
XXXIndividual mandate
Requirements for Coverage
Private PlansPublic Plan at Intermediate RatesPublic Plan at Medicare Rates
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Although all three paths would achieve the goal of health insurance coverage for 
all, each would have different implications for major stakeholders and sources of 
coverage. Most important, these approaches would slow the growth of health spending to 
varying degrees and have different federal budget implications. 
 
Analysis of these alternative paths yields the following results: 
 
• Health system savings. All three paths would produce substantial health system 
savings over the 11-year period from 2010 through 2020, with cumulative savings  
of $3.0 trillion under the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates scenario,  
$2.0 trillion under the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates scenario, and 
$1.2 trillion under the Private Plans scenario. 
• Source of differences in savings. Differences in system savings under the three 
scenarios derive from insurance administrative savings realized by the offer of a 
public health insurance plan in competition with private plans; from the tighter 
payment rates used by the public plan; and from the application of payment 
innovations and system reforms to a greater share of the insured population under  
the two scenarios that feature a public plan. 
- About $265 billion in insurance administrative savings are projected over 
2010–2020 in the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path compared 
with $223 billion in savings in the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment 
Rates path, while the Private Plans scenario would result in an increase in 
administrative costs of $32 billion. 
- The great majority of system savings—ranging from $2.7 trillion to $1.2 
trillion over 2010–2020 under the three scenarios—comes from greater 
efficiencies in care delivery and slower growth in health care spending. 
Revenues of providers continue to grow throughout the period, albeit at a 
slower rate than at present, and with differential effects across providers.  
In the absence of reform, cumulative national health expenditures will be  
$40 trillion over the 11 years. 
• Bending the curve in health spending. The currently projected 6.5 percent annual 
rate of growth in national health expenditures over the 2010–2020 period would be 
reduced to 5.2 percent with the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path, 5.6 
percent with the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path, and 5.8 percent 
with the Private Plans path (Exhibit ES-2). The Public Plan with Medicare Payment 
Rates approach is the most aggressive in controlling costs but still slows health care 
 x
cost growth less than the 1.5-percentage-point annual savings commitment recently 
offered by industry groups. 
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• Share of economic resources. Although the percentage of GDP spent on health care 
would be lower in 2020 under each scenario compared with the currently projected 
21.3 percent, health spending would in each case account for a higher share of the 
U.S. economy than the 17.6 percent expected in 2009—18.7 percent under the  
Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates approach, 19.4 percent under the  
Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates approach, and 19.9 percent under  
the Private Plans approach. 
• Expanded coverage. Under all three scenarios, the insurance expansion would bring 
about near-universal coverage. The number of uninsured would drop from an 
estimated 48 million in 2009 (16% of the population) to 4 million by 2012 (1% of the 
population), with that extent of coverage maintained through the end of the decade 
(Exhibit ES-3). Absent reform, the number of uninsured is projected to rise to at least 
61 million by 2020. 
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Exhibit ES-3. Trend in the Number of Uninsured, 2009–2020 
Under Current Law and Three Path Scenarios
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• Impact on premiums. Estimates indicate that premiums for the public plan choice in 
the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path would initially be 25 percent 
below those currently available for a comparable benefit package in the private 
individual/small firm market and 16 percent lower under the Public Plan with 
Intermediate Payment Rates scenario (Exhibit ES-4). Private plan premiums would 
initially be 3 percent lower within the exchange as it facilitates the process of 
choosing plans and reduces administrative costs, especially for individuals and  
small businesses. 
 
 
 xii
$4,704 $4,548
$4,068
$3,528
$3,948
$0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
Private with
Rules, No
Exchange
Private, Initial,
Inside
Exchange
Private, with
Effective Cost
Controls
Public,
Intermediate
Rates
Public,
Medicare
* Premiums for same benefits and population. Benefits used to model: full scope of acute care medical benefits; 
$250 individual/$500 family deductible; 10% coinsurance physicians services; 25% coinsurance, no deductible 
prescription drugs ; full coverage preventive care. $5,000 individual/$7,000 family out-of-pocket cost limit. 
Data: Estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund.
Average annual premium per household for same benefits at community rate*
3% 14% 16% 25%
THE 
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
Exhibit ES-4. Estimated Annual Premiums
Under Different Scenarios, 2010
 
 
 
• Effective private-sector cost containment. Offering a public health insurance plan 
as an alternative choice should be a catalyst for private plans to innovate in the way 
they operate and pay for care. It would help them reduce their administrative costs 
and implement payment and system reforms that lead to more appropriate utilization, 
better care, and slower cost growth—and, in the process, contribute to reduced 
premiums. Community health plans partnering with integrated health care delivery 
systems in particular have considerable potential to achieve economies through 
redesign of care, control of chronic conditions, and prevention of avoidable 
hospitalizations. Private plans could also be given the authority to adopt public plan 
payment methods and rates. If private plans adopt effective cost-containment 
measures sufficient to slow a rise in their premiums relative to trends in public plan 
premiums, over a three-to-five-year period public plan premiums and private plan 
premiums within the exchange would be roughly comparable. 
• Impact on federal budget. Over the 2010–2020 period, the cumulative net increase 
in federal budget outlays is estimated to be $112 billion under the Public Plan with 
Medicare Payment Rates scenario, $232 billion under the Public Plan with Intermediate 
 xiii
Payment Rates scenario, and $360 billion under the Private Plans scenario (Exhibit 
ES-5). The federal budget costs of covering the uninsured and providing premium 
assistance to low-to-moderate-income working families are lowest under a public 
plan paying at Medicare rates and highest under private plans paying commercial 
provider payment rates. Under each scenario, most federal budget costs are incurred 
in the first five years, as the uninsured are covered and premium assistance is 
provided to low-to-moderate-income individuals (Exhibit ES-6). Over the longer 
term, most of the federal budget offsetting savings comes from Medicare payment 
and system reforms, as well as from increased taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and sugared 
soft drinks. 
 
 
Exhibit ES-5. Net Cumulative Impact on National Health Expenditures, 
2010–2020 Compared with Baseline,
Three Insurance Exchange Scenarios, by Major Payer Groups
Dollars in billions
Note: A negative number indicates spending increases compared with projected expenditures;
a positive indicates spending decreases (i.e., savings).
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Exhibit ES-6. Change in Net Federal Spending Under Three Path Scenarios
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• Impact on employer costs. In all three scenarios, employers are required to cover 
workers or contribute 7 percent of workers’ earnings up to $1.25 an hour to a health 
insurance fund. As a result, those employers who do not now cover their employees 
would bear added cost. However, employers who now cover their workers would 
benefit from insurance, payment, and system reforms that lower insurance premiums 
and slow future growth in health care costs. Employers would fare best when their 
employees have access to a public health insurance plan that provides value for the 
premium dollar. Over the 2010–2020 period, payment and system savings with the 
Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path would offset any additional costs that 
health reform might produce for employers and workers as slower premium growth 
would result in net cumulative employer savings of $78 billion—although the effects 
on different employers would vary (Exhibit ES-5). Employers would incur $163 
billion in increased cost under the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path 
and $579 billion under the Private Plans path over the 2010–2020 period. 
• Impact on households. In all three scenarios, the bulk of total savings over time 
would benefit individuals and families as a result of slower growth in premiums and 
 xv
out-of-pocket spending, the availability of federal premium assistance, and the 
expansion of public programs to make insurance affordable. These savings would 
accrue across all income groups. By 2020, annual savings per household would 
average $2,228 under the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates scenario, $1,634 
under the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates scenario, and $1,576 under 
the Private Plans scenario. Total savings to households over the period from 2010 
through 2020 under the three scenarios are estimated to be $2.1 trillion, $1.6 trillion, 
and $1.5 trillion, respectively (Exhibit ES-5). 
 
In short, the presence of a public plan and the payment policies that it encompasses 
account for most of the total health system savings and federal budget cost differences 
among the alternative scenarios. Differing results reflect the relative aggressiveness and 
effectiveness of various cost-containment strategies and the creation of a new dynamic 
for transforming both health insurance and the provision of health care. The choice of a 
public plan provides a less-expensive base for expanding coverage than private plans, 
because a public plan would, at least initially, be paying at lower rates than private plans 
currently do (but at higher rates than most providers now receive for uninsured and 
Medicaid patients). Adoption of a public plan would also enable more rapid spread of 
payment reforms, since more people would be covered under plans that adopt those reforms. 
The public plan also achieves economies through lower insurance administrative costs. 
Although the outcome is difficult to predict, private plans, too, could be expected to 
respond to the new competitive dynamic, by partnering with integrated delivery systems 
to provide incentives and tools for more effective care, as well as to eliminate ineffective, 
avoidable, or duplicative care and achieve economies in insurance administration. 
 
Although spending growth would slow, most providers would experience rising 
revenues and opportunities for shared savings, as preventable hospitalizations and greater 
efficiency in delivery of care are realized. Coverage of the uninsured and improved 
benefits for them would reduce bad debts and infuse new revenues into the health system 
in the early years, benefitting in particular the safety-net providers that now offer charity 
care to those who cannot pay. 
 
At this critical juncture, the national reform debate should stay focused on the key 
coverage, payment, and system reforms that are necessary to put the nation on a path to 
high performance in health care. Recently, debate has centered on which direction the 
nation should take to move forward. However coverage is provided, reforms should 
ensure that everyone has the benefit of insurance plans that serve as agents for the public 
by pooling risk, paying for effective care, and requiring accountability for outcomes. The 
 xvi
key issues should be how best to provide access to high-quality, affordable care for all, 
now and into the future. That is the goal of comprehensive health reform, and we should 
be careful not to lose sight of it. 
 
All three paths described here, combined with an integrated set of payment and 
system reforms, would represent major steps toward the goal of covering the uninsured. 
But with the nation’s economic and fiscal future at risk, health reform must pay particular 
attention to effective strategies for altering the future course of spending for health care 
and increasing value obtained for the resources devoted to the health system. 
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FORK IN THE ROAD: 
ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO A 
HIGH PERFORMANCE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. health system is traveling down a fiscally dangerous road. By 2020, over one-
fifth of the nation’s economic resources—21.3 percent of the gross domestic product 
(GDP)—will go toward providing health care without commensurate return in access, 
health outcomes, or value of services. In spite of all that spending, an estimated 61 million 
people will be uninsured in 2020, and over 30 million more will be underinsured, at risk 
of incurring medical bills they cannot afford and accumulating debt for health care 
expenses. We simply cannot continue on our current course. 
 
The Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System 
has set forth an integrated framework for putting the U.S. health system on the path to 
reaching a high performance health system which yields better access, improved quality 
of care, and greater efficiency by 2020.1 The framework lays out five essential goals for 
comprehensive reform: 
 
• Affordable coverage for all; 
• Align incentives with value and effective cost control; 
• Accountable, accessible, patient-centered, and coordinated care; 
• Aim high to improve quality, health outcomes, and efficiency; and 
• Accountable leadership and collaboration to set and achieve national goals. 
 
That framework, published in February 2009, built on President Obama’s 
campaign health reform plan and was consistent with the eight principles for health 
reform set forth in his administration’s budget blueprint.2 Key features include creation 
of a national exchange that offers to everyone a choice of private insurance plans and a 
new public health insurance option; requirements that individuals obtain coverage and 
employers help finance health coverage for their workers; promotion of more efficient 
and integrated health care delivery through the use of innovative provider payment 
approaches; promulgation of health information technology and comparative-
effectiveness research to improve quality of care and enhance value in health care 
spending; and adoption of public-health initiatives to reduce obesity and tobacco use. 
Modeling based on an illustrative set of policies indicated that such a comprehensive, 
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integrated approach has the potential to extend affordable coverage to everyone, improve 
health outcomes, and slow the growth of health care spending. 
 
THREE SCENARIOS 
National debate is currently centered on the question of how to slow the growth of health 
care costs to sustain coverage while ensuring quality care. A controversial component of 
this debate is whether to offer a new public insurance plan choice to the under-65 
population. This report by Commonwealth Fund staff is intended to inform that debate. It 
analyzes alternative approaches to defining the role of a public health insurance plan and 
presents estimates of the potential impacts of those approaches on health spending. The 
three alternative paths to high performance include: 
 
• Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates. This path includes a public health 
insurance plan that pays providers at Medicare rates and is offered alongside private 
plans within a national health insurance exchange. 
• Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates. This path includes a public health 
insurance plan that pays providers at rates midway between current Medicare and 
private plan rates and is offered alongside private plans within a national health 
insurance exchange and subject to the same market rules as they are. 
• Private Plans. This path does not feature a public plan option, but rather includes  
only private plans offered to employers and individuals through a national health 
insurance exchange. 
 
As the reform debate has evolved, attention has turned to increasing the 
effectiveness of the insurance exchange and trimming federal budget costs. Accordingly, 
this report modifies some of the Commission on a High Performance Health System’s 
original “Path” specifications in all three scenarios. Revised policy assumptions include: 
 
• Requiring that all individual coverage be purchased through the national health 
insurance exchange to lower administrative costs and pool risks; 
• Limiting the availability of income-related premium assistance to coverage purchased 
through the exchange to achieve efficient distribution; 
• Targeting of premium assistance to low-to-moderate-income households; and 
• Keeping the current Medicare benefit structure rather than offering a new  
Medicare supplement. 
 2
To focus on the difficulties associated with designing and offering a public health 
insurance plan option, the modeling assumes that each of the three insurance framework 
options include the same insurance market reforms—in order to ensure participation and 
affordability—and that each institutes the same Medicare payment and system reforms to 
align incentives with value and improve the outcomes and efficiency of the health care 
delivery system. Exhibit 1 outlines the shared set of integrated policies and contrasts key 
differences in the choice of plans and provider payment rates under the three scenarios 
offered through the insurance exchange. Modification of the Path framework is noted in 
the more detailed Appendix (see page 37). These estimates differ from earlier ones 
because of these policy changes as well as the February revisions in baseline spending 
projections by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
 
 
Exhibit 1. Policy Provisions Under Three Reform Scenarios
XXXComparative effectiveness
System Reform
XXXExpand Medicaid/CHIP
XXXHealth information technology
XXXPublic Health
Provider Payment Reform
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private plans
Required for public plan;
voluntary for private plans
Required for public plan;
voluntary for private plansPayment on value, not volume
Unchanged
Midpoint between Medicare and 
commercial level for public plan; 
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commercial level for private plansCost restraints on provider prices
XXXMedicaid at Medicare rates
Bought in at 
commercial levelMost bought in at midpoint levelBought in at Medicare levelCoverage of the uninsured
Changes to Current Public Programs
XXXRetain current Medicare benefit structure
XXXEnd Medicare disability waiting period
XXXCommunity rating
XXXGuaranteed access and renewal
XXXMinimum benefit standard    
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Insurance Exchange
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pay 7% of earnings 
Insure workers or
pay 7% of earnings 
Insure workers or
pay 7% of earnings Employer shared responsibility
XXXIndividual mandate
Requirements for Coverage
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Market Rules and Payment Rates 
Because of the urgency of the country’s health care, economic, and financial crises, the 
Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path contains provisions for achieving rapid 
transformation of the health insurance market as well as the organization and delivery of 
health care services. Most importantly, it offers a public health insurance plan with much 
lower premiums than current plans—as a consequence of lower administrative overhead 
and provider payment at Medicare rates which fall below those of commercial insurers 
(but above Medicaid payment rates and above the limited payment for the uninsured). 
 
Some experts and stakeholders are concerned that a public plan paying at 
Medicare rates would make it difficult for private insurers and providers to transform 
their operations quickly enough to compete effectively.3 Various compromise proposals 
have been suggested that could “level the playing field” for competing private plans and 
the public plan, increase payment rates to providers under the public plan above Medicare 
levels, and apply uniform rules to private plans and the public plan.4
 
In the two scenarios that offer a public plan, the same insurance standards and 
rules would apply to the public plan and competing private plans. Key elements include: 
 
• Premiums: Like private plans, the public plan would be financially self-sustaining, 
with premiums set to cover projected medical outlays and administrative overhead. 
• Premium reserves: The public plan would set premiums to enable a premium reserve 
fund, as the federal government now does with the Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) 
standard option in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (which is 
administered by BCBS for an administrative fee paid by the federal government). 
• Premium assistance: Premium support to low-to-moderate-income enrollees would be 
available for both private plans and a public plan offered through the exchange. The 
assistance would be benchmarked to the most efficient plan (based on cost and quality). 
• Standards: Both public and private plans would be required to meet minimum benefit 
standards and reporting in order to ensure adequate financial protection for enrollees 
and facilitate comparison of plans in the insurance exchange. 
• Governance: The government agency or board overseeing the public plan (e.g., the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services or a new agency within the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services) would be separate and distinct from the 
public or quasi-public authority that sets the rules and runs the insurance exchange. 
• Regulations: The public plan would be subject to the same laws and regulations as 
self-insured private plans. National standards for consumer protections, public 
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reporting, essential benefits, and market rules on nondiscrimination against the sick 
(e.g., guaranteed issue and community rating) would apply equally to private plans 
and the public plan. Self-insured plans typically offered by large employers now are 
not subject to state premium taxes; the public health insurance plan would be 
similarly exempt. In addition, neither nonprofit private insurers nor public plans 
would be subject to corporate income taxes. 
• Payment reforms: The public plan would incorporate innovative payment reforms 
that reward value not volume, as would Medicare and Medicaid; private insurers 
could, if they choose, adopt similar payment reforms that reward results rather than 
volume of services provided. The goal should be to institute multipayer reforms  
that apply to both public and private payment for providers, but these have not yet 
been modeled. 
• Payment level: The public health insurance plan would pay providers at Medicare 
rates in the first scenario and at rates intermediate between Medicare and commercial 
rates in the second scenario. For modeling purposes, payment rates are set at the 
midpoint between Medicare and commercial payment rates. Future policy would be 
to establish a process (e.g., payment council or commission similar to MedPAC) to 
determine a “fair payment rate sufficient for efficient operations.”5 Medicaid 
payments would be raised to Medicare levels and incorporate payment reforms. 
• Quality standards: Providers in private plans and the public plan would be required to 
meet the same standards for quality of care. 
• Enforcement: Physicians choosing to be out-of-network and not participate in public 
and private plans could do so, but physicians charging in excess of a given threshold 
(e.g., 10% to 15% above the approved intermediate plan rates) would be at risk of 
losing Medicare participation. Unified federal policies would ensure quality and 
efficiency, and all payers would use their purchasing leverage to effectively bend the 
curve in health spending and promote more integrated, coordinated care delivery. 
 
Establishing a level playing field on standards and rules for all insurers would 
enable competition among them on “value added” services, such as their ability to 
achieve efficiencies in insurance operations and to develop and implement innovative 
payment arrangements. Obviously, it makes little sense to continue payment incentives 
that reward increased volume and complexity of services rather than more efficient care 
with better outcomes. Accordingly, each Path scenario would include new payment 
methods that apply to Medicare, Medicaid, and any other public plan. Private plans could 
also adopt the public plan payment rules or innovate in other ways. 
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Currently, it is argued that prices charged to private insurers, especially hospital 
charges, should cover the costs of providing care to the uninsured and bad debt/charity 
for the underinsured. All three Path scenarios would provide affordable coverage to 
everyone and would raise Medicaid payments to Medicare levels. These reforms would 
earn hospitals and physicians an estimated $60 billion or more in new revenues per year 
and eliminate the need for implicit cross-subsidies that are built into current charges to 
private insurers. This infusion of funds and reduction of provider bad debts would enable 
private plans to adopt new payment rules that are incorporated in Medicare and the public 
health insurance plan, with incentives for more effective and efficient integrated care. 
Community health plans that partner with integrated delivery systems and accountable-
care organizations would be particularly well positioned to respond to the new 
competitive dynamic by offering a competing public coverage plan that would redesign 
care procedures, adopt optimal practices and health information technology, and employ 
team approaches to care of patients with chronic conditions. 
 
Recently, health insurers, providers, and labor organizations have committed to an 
effort to eventually slow the growth in health expenditures by 1.5 percentage points 
annually.6 However, since no enforcement mechanisms or specific policies were 
proposed at the time that estimates of the three Path scenarios were made, the impact of 
that pledge could not be modeled here. 
 
The private health insurance sector has offered to abide by new regulations 
governing the sale of private insurance, and these market rules are assumed in all three 
scenarios. The rules include a commitment to community rating, with the same premium 
charged to enrollees regardless of health status or gender.7 Open enrollment would permit 
anyone to qualify for coverage, and renewal would be guaranteed even if enrollees 
incurred health problems. A national insurance exchange with market rules governing 
risk-pooling applied broadly across plans sold inside and outside the exchange would 
pool risks more equitably but might not lower average premiums as more individuals 
with serious health conditions are covered. 
 
The health insurance exchange would be open to individuals and employer 
groups, phased in over four years by size of firm, with community rating, guaranteed-
access and renewal provisions, and a minimum benefit standard applying across all 
markets. In all three scenarios, the insurance exchange would be the source of all 
insurance sold on an individual basis, and all premium assistance would flow through the 
insurance exchange. 
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Need for Risk Adjustment: Focusing Competition on Adding Value 
To promote competition based on better health outcomes, quality of care, and insurance 
efficiency, there would need to be a mechanism to make adjustments for health risks 
across plans. With 20 percent of the population accounting for 80 percent of total spending 
each year, any plan would be at a competitive disadvantage if it earned a reputation for 
providing excellent care and access for those with chronic or serious health conditions. A 
risk-adjustment mechanism that recalculated rates and protected plans if they enrolled a 
sicker mix of patients would focus competition on adding value of service rather than risk 
segmentation. Such a mechanism would also encourage plans to advertise their performance 
with seriously ill patients—a practice that could put plans at risk in current markets. 
 
A scenario with a public insurance plan that accepts everyone also opens the door 
to the possibility that private insurers might “compete” by using network designs or 
targeted marketing that attracts a healthier mix of patients. This sort of experience within 
the current Medicare program has led to increasingly sophisticated methods of risk-
adjustment rating and oversight. Although existing risk-adjustment approaches are less 
than perfect, they have improved over the last decade. It should be possible to devise a 
risk-adjustment mechanism that could protect the public insurance plan option as well as 
safeguard private insurers that attract a high proportion of sicker patients because of their 
reputations for high-quality and responsive care. Policy leaders could draw from 
international as well as U.S. experience to guide this effort.8
 
ESTIMATED IMPACTS 
Estimates of the impacts of the three paths—Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates, 
Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates, and Private Plans—are based on modeling 
by The Lewin Group using illustrative specifications provided by the authors and 
outlined in the Appendix (see page 37). The results based on those specifications were 
drawn from available evidence concerning their potential impact on the people who 
would be affected by the plans and their behavioral responses. The same parameters 
apply to all three scenarios. 
 
All three paths would achieve the goal of health insurance coverage for all, 
though each would do so with different mechanisms and with very different implications 
for major stakeholders. Most importantly, all three approaches would bend the cost curve, 
though the savings achieved would differ significantly among them. The following 
sections include estimates of the impacts of the three alternative paths to high 
performance as they relate to costs, sources of coverage, administrative complexity, and 
savings for businesses, families, and government. 
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Impact on Bending the Health Care Cost Curve 
Findings indicate that, with all policies starting in 2010, it would be possible under each 
scenario to extend affordable coverage to all and improve population health while 
simultaneously bending the curve of projected national health spending. Compared with 
current trends projected over the 11-year period from 2010 through 2020, cumulative 
savings would amount to $3.0 trillion with the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates 
path; $2.0 trillion with the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path; and $1.2 
trillion with the Private Plans path (Exhibit 2). These system savings would result from the 
additional utilization of services that can be expected if the uninsured are covered and 
benefits are improved for the underinsured. 
 
 
Exhibit 2. Three Insurance Exchange Scenarios:
Cumulative 11-Year Savings in National Health Expenditures, 2010–2020
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$3.5 Option 1—Public Plan at Medicare Rates
Option 2—Public Plan at Intermediate Rates
Option 3—Private Plans
Cumulative national health expenditure savings compared with baseline (trillions)
Data: Estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund.
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Relative to current trends, the integrated approaches could reduce the projected 
annual rate of growth in national health expenditures from 6.5 percent per year to 5.2 
percent under the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path, 5.6 percent under the 
Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path, and 5.8 percent under the Private 
Plans path (Exhibit 3). 
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Notably, even after these substantial reductions, national health spending would 
still continue to exceed the projected annual growth in GDP. Although the percentage of 
GDP spent on health care would be lower in 2020 under each scenario than the 21.3 
percent currently projected—18.7 percent, 19.4 percent, and 19.9 percent, respectively—
health spending under each would account for a higher share of the U.S. economy than in 
2009 (17.6%). 
 
Source of Savings 
Differences in system savings under the three path scenarios derive from insurance 
administrative savings realized by the offer of a public plan in competition with private 
plans; from the tighter payment rates used by the public plan; and by the application of 
payment innovations and system reforms to a greater share of the insured population 
under the scenarios that have a public health insurance plan. Compared with trends 
projected for 2010 through 2020, the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path 
would reduce insurance costs by a cumulative $425 billion, reflecting both lower 
administrative costs and the shift of some coverage from private insurance to a public 
plan paying at Medicare rates (Exhibit 4). By contrast, the net health system cost of 
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covering the uninsured under the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path 
would be $547 billion greater from 2010 through 2020 than currently projected trends. 
This net cost rather than net savings derives from the uninsured buying into coverage at 
intermediate provider payment rates rather than at lower Medicare payment rates and less 
of a shift of coverage to public health insurance from private coverage at still higher 
rates. As for the net insurance cost under the Private Plans path, it would add $1.2 trillion 
to national spending because the uninsured would be covered at the higher commercial 
provider payment rates, with no opportunity to save by switching from private to public 
insurance, and with no savings in insurance administrative costs. 
 
 
Exhibit 4. Major Sources of Savings Compared with Projected Spending,
Net Cumulative Reduction of National Health Expenditures, 2010–2020
Payment and System Reforms
Affordable Coverage for All: Coverage Expansion 
and National Health Insurance Exchange
–$1,446–$1,530–$1,557• Information Infrastructure and Public Health
+$1,167+$547–$425Total System Cost of Coverage Expansion and Improvement
–$2,353–$2,516–$2,568Total Savings from Payment and System Reforms
–$907–$986–$1,011• Payment Reforms
Private Plans
Public Plan
at Intermediate 
Rates
Public Plan
at Medicare 
Rates
–$1,969
–$223
+$770
Total Net Impact on National Health Expenditures, 
2010–2020
• Reduced administrative costs
• Net costs of coverage expansion
–$1,186
+$32
+$1,135
–$2,993
–$265
–$160
Data: Estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund, April–May, 2009.
Dollars in billions
 
 
 
For each of the integrated approaches, the policies mentioned in the analysis 
interact and are mutually supporting. All contribute to the net cumulative effect on 
potential savings and improvement in value of services. These estimated impacts are 
contingent on their effectiveness in stimulating changes in the way that providers, 
patients, and insurers (both public and private) behave, and how they react to the new 
opportunities the proposed policies would create. Each set of policies is designed with a 
vision of potential dynamic change—a chain of events with effects that interact over time. 
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A central feature in each of the alternatives is the insurance exchange, which is 
structured to expand the choice of plans in the context of market rules prohibiting 
competition on the basis of risk selection. The goal of associated reforms is to promote 
competition based on value in order to drive innovation among insurers and to foster 
better organization of care. 
 
The new public health insurance plan (in both the Public Plan with Medicare 
Payment Rates and the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates paths) and Medicare 
and Medicaid would adopt innovative payment methods that reward results rather than 
volume of services. Private insurers could adopt such payment methods if they so chose. 
Public payers would share savings from the behavioral changes of providers, in for 
instance eliminating waste and ineffective care, which would result in a slowdown in 
public program spending over time. As indicated by the sharp differences across the three 
Path scenarios, the public plan plays a central role in harnessing market forces for 
positive change. 
 
Offering a choice of a public plan makes it possible for payment reforms to spread 
more rapidly than at present and provides a less expensive means for expanding coverage 
to the uninsured. In essence, the public plan enables consolidated purchasing power on 
behalf of the population. A public plan also offers an avenue for lowering administrative 
costs. The public plan would operate with low or no marketing costs, with no costs for 
underwriting, and with premium margins invested in reserve funds. The public plan would 
thus serve as a catalyst for competing private plans to make their operations more efficient. 
 
About $265 billion in insurance administrative savings are projected over 2010–
2020 in the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path, compared with $223 billion 
under the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path and an extra cost of $32 
billion under the Private Plans path. 
 
The great majority of savings in the three scenarios—ranging from $2.7 trillion to 
$1.2 trillion over the period 2010 to 2020—come from greater efficiencies in care 
delivery and reduced growth in health care spending. Revenues of providers would 
continue to grow throughout the period, albeit at a slower rate than at present and with 
differential effects across providers. In the absence of reform, national health 
expenditures will be $40 trillion over the 2010–2020 period. 
 
Impact on Health Insurance Coverage 
The insurance framework under all three scenarios includes the creation of a new national 
insurance exchange, expansion of existing public programs, market reforms, provisions 
for affordability, and requirements that coverage reach universal participation. 
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Under all three scenarios, the expansion of insurance would achieve near-
universal coverage. The number of uninsured would drop from an estimated 48 million in 
2009 (16% of the U.S. population) to 4 million by 2012 (1% of the population), with 
nearly everyone insured within the next decade (Exhibit 5). Absent new initiatives, the 
number of uninsured is projected to rise to 61 million or more by 2020, not counting the 
millions more who lose coverage or are underinsured. 
 
Exhibit 5. Trend in the Number of Uninsured, 2009–2020
Under Current Law and Three Path Scenarios
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Note: Assumes insurance exchange opens in 2010 and take-up by uninsured occurs over two years. 
Remaining uninsured are mainly non-tax-filers.
Data: Estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund.
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Insurance Exchange 
All plans participating in the insurance exchange would be required to meet minimum 
benefit standards comparable to those included in the Federal Employees Health Benefits 
Program standard option (Exhibit 6). This requirement would improve financial 
protection for millions of people who now have difficulty paying medical bills because of 
gaps in coverage, limits on benefits, or high deductibles and cost-sharing relative to 
income. Targeted premium caps would ensure affordability for low-to-middle-income 
households (Exhibit 7). 
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Exhibit 6. Benefit Design for Public Health Insurance Plan
Offered in Insurance Exchange
Current Medicare Benefits* New Public Health Insurance Plan in Exchange
Deductible
Hospital: $1,024/benefit period
Physician: $135/year
Rx: $275/year**
Hospital/Physician: $250/year for 
individuals; $500 for families
Rx: $0
Coinsurance Physician: 20%Rx: Depends on Part D plan
Physician: 10%
Rx: 25%
Reduce for high-value and chronic 
disease care/medical home 
Preventive services: 0% 
Ceiling on
out-of-pocket No ceiling
$5,000 for individuals
$7,000 for families
Insurance-related 
premium 
subsidies
Medicare Savings Programs
Low-Income Subsidy
Premium cap ceiling of 5% of 
income for low-income beneficiary 
premiums or 10% if higher income
* Basic benefits before Medigap.
** Part D coverage varies, often deductible. Most have “doughnut” hole and use tiered, flat-dollar copayments.
Note: Benefit design also would apply to Medicare Extra supplement option available to Medicare beneficiaries. 
Source: Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System, The Path to a High Performance
U.S. Health System: A 2020 Vision and the Policies to Pave the Way (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, Feb. 2009.
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Exhibit 7. Premium Affordability: Insurance-Related Premium Subsidies
35% tax bracket
33% tax bracket
28% tax bracket
25% tax bracket
15% tax bracket
Below 150% FPL
No cap$372,950 or higherSingle
No cap$208,850–$372,949Family
12%$82,250–$171,549Single
12%$137,050–$208,849Family
No cap$171,550–$372,949Single
Family
Family
Single
Family
Single
Family
Single
5%$16,245–$33,949
5%$27,465–$67,899
10%$33,950–$82,249
10%$67,900–$137,049
Premium as a 
Percentage
of Income
Income Range
0%$16,245 or lower
$27,465 or lower 0%
$372,950 of higher No cap
Note: Family income ranges based on family size of three.
Source: United States Department of Health and Human Services, “Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines,” 
Federal Register: Jan. 23, 2009 (Vol. 74, No. 14), 4199-4201; United States Internal Revenue Service, 2009 Tax 
Rate Schedule X and Y-1.
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By building on existing insurance coverage, the Path framework would provide 
new choices through the insurance exchange yet permit all employer groups to keep their 
current coverage arrangements if those work well for them. Individuals would receive 
insurance through the exchange with its choice of multiple plans. Employers could 
purchase coverage directly from private insurers or self-insure as most large employers 
now do, or they could elect to bring their employees as a group into the insurance 
exchange and thus gain access to a menu of private national plans, local/regional plans, 
and, in the first two scenarios, a nationwide public plan. 
 
Coverage through the exchange has the potential to increase the stability of 
coverage as well as to expand choice. All those enrolled through the exchange would be 
able to keep their coverage as jobs or circumstances changed. The insurance exchange 
could be opened in stages to allow reasonable setting-up time. The modeling assumes that 
the exchange starts out by opening to individuals and small firms with fewer than 100 
employees, opens to mid-sized companies (under 500 employees) in two years, and opens 
to all employers by 2014. 
 
Impact on Premiums 
Estimates suggest that premiums for the public health insurance plan choice in the Public 
Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path would initially be 25 percent below premiums 
currently available for a comparable benefit package in the private individual/small-firm 
market in 2010 and 16 percent lower under the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment 
Rates scenario (Exhibit 8). Private plan premiums in all three scenarios would be 3 percent 
lower within the exchange than current individual and small-firm premiums, as the exchange 
facilitates the process of choosing plans and reduces administrative costs, especially for 
individuals and small businesses. The lower premiums reflect savings in insurance 
overhead for plans offered through the exchange with their more standardized products, 
lower marketing costs, reduced churning, and elimination of most underwriting costs. 
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Exhibit 8. Estimated Annual Premiums
Under Different Scenarios, 2010
 
 
 
Effective Private-Sector Cost Containment 
Including a public plan as an alternative choice should be a catalyst for private plans to 
innovate in the way they operate and pay for care, reducing their administrative costs and 
implementing payment and system reforms that lead to more appropriate utilization, 
better care, and slower cost growth, in the process contributing to greater premium 
savings. If private plans adopted effective cost-containment measures sufficient to slow 
premiums relative to trends in the public plan premium, public plan premiums and private 
plan premiums within the exchange would be roughly comparable (Exhibit 8). Or, private 
plans could be given the authority to adopt public plan provider payment methods. 
However, what such measures would entail and how they would be implemented to make 
refined estimates would require examination in greater detail. 
 
With the flexibility to establish more integrated-care networks and a variety of 
utilization management and payment policies, private plans could—by focusing on 
innovation and quality—compete with each other and outperform the public plan. 
Community health plans partnering with integrated delivery systems, in particular, have 
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considerable potential to achieve economies through redesign of care, control of chronic 
conditions, and prevention of avoidable hospitalizations. 
 
Plan provisions could encourage multipayer synchronization to ensure coherent 
policies and reduce administrative complexity. The aim would be to encourage more 
vigorous, innovative, and value-driven competition, focused on outcomes and a more 
streamlined, efficient health insurance financing system. 
 
Experience with Medicare Advantage private plan bids suggests that private 
health plans in many parts of the country will be able to compete effectively. Bids 
submitted by the most tightly organized private health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) under the Medicare Advantage program have been consistently lower than 
Medicare fee-for-service spending.9 Currently, the more integrated-plan bids average  
98 percent of fee-for-service Medicare costs while the more loosely organized private 
fee-for-service-plan bids average 13 percent higher, which suggests that the latter may 
not be able to compete effectively in an insurance exchange against a public plan option 
(Exhibit 9). 
 
 
Exhibit 9. Medicare Advantage Plans Bids as a Percent of
Average Medicare Fee-for-Service Costs, by Plan Type, 2009
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Coverage Through the Insurance Exchange 
Employment-sponsored health insurance would continue to be the mainstay of health 
insurance coverage under all three scenarios. All three Path reforms do address many of 
the flaws in the current system, however. Each gives employers the option of purchasing 
coverage directly from private insurers, or self-insuring, or bringing their employees as a 
group into the national health insurance exchange. Each approach sets rules on insurance 
exchange plans, including ones relating to open enrollment, community premiums, and a 
standard benefit floor. 
 
In all three scenarios, approximately 64 percent of the U.S. population (194 million–
196 million people) would have employer-sponsored coverage by 2014, a substantial 
increase over the 53 percent (164 million people) that have employer coverage under the 
current system (Exhibit 10). This increased number would include those employer groups 
that opt to join the insurance exchange. If coverage is obtained through the exchange, 
employees could select from among a number of private health plans as well as the new 
public plan contained in two of the scenarios examined here. 
 
 
Current Law (2010)
Employer
Direct 
164 m
53%
Uninsured
49 m
16%
Medicare
39 m
13%
Medicaid
41 m
14%
Public Plan at
Intermediate Rates
(2014)
Data: Estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund.
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(2014)
Private Plans
(2014)
Exhibit 10. Employers Remain Primary Sponsor of Coverage
Under Three Reform Scenarios
Distribution of 307 Million People by Primary Source of Coverage
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The modeling estimates that over time more than 70 percent of those covered by 
employer-based plans (141 million out of 196 million) would receive coverage through 
the exchange in the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path, with its advantages 
of continuity, choice, and a new, affordable public plan option. Considering the smaller 
differences in provider payment rates between insurance plans offered inside and outside 
the insurance exchange in the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path, the 
modeling estimates that 52 percent of employer-based coverage (102 million people) would 
come through the exchange. With higher premiums under the Private Plans approach, 
fewer employers would switch to the insurance exchange—an estimated 37 percent of 
those with employer-based coverage (72 million people) would be covered through it 
(Exhibit 10). The insurance exchange would replace the individual insurance market—
with 18 million to 19 million individuals obtaining coverage through the exchange. 
 
Under all three scenarios, most employees would have a considerably larger 
choice of plans than is now offered by their employers. Further, each path has the 
potential to reduce turnover in coverage. As more employers join the exchange, people 
could keep coverage as they change or lose jobs during a period of unemployment. 
 
Source of New, Improved, or More-Affordable Coverage 
The new public health insurance plan option in the first two scenarios would provide a 
less expensive alternative for the uninsured and underinsured than what is currently 
available in the individual and small-business insurance markets. Lower premiums would 
derive from significantly lower administrative costs and use of reformed provider 
payment methods at reasonable rates. 
 
In the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates scenario, an estimated 26 million 
uninsured would be covered through the exchange (Exhibit 11). About 13 million would 
be covered by Medicaid. A few (5 million) would take up their employers’ offer and be 
covered directly by employer plans outside the exchange. In the other scenarios, the 
numbers covered by Medicaid would be similar, but a higher proportion would be 
covered directly by employer plans outside the exchange. 
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Exhibit 11. Source of New Coverage for the Uninsured
Under Three Reform Scenarios, 2014
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The exchange is not only attractive to the uninsured but is a major source of 
improved or more affordable coverage for those who are now insured. About 159 million 
insured people would move into the exchange under the Public Plan with Medicare 
Payment Rates scenario, 120 million under the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment 
Rates scenario, and 91 million under the Private Plans scenario (Exhibit 12). 
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In both scenarios that include a choice of a public plan, families would have the 
security of an option that is always available. Unlike the situation in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s in the Medicare managed care market, or recent experience in some state 
Medicaid programs,10 enrollees in the nationwide public plan could be sure that their plan 
would not be dropped from their geographic area. Notably, the decision to join the 
exchange or select private or public plans would be voluntary—decisions to switch would 
indicate moves to more affordable or higher-quality options. 
 
Distribution of Impact Across Major Payer Groups 
All major sectors would benefit from improved health and from bending the curve of 
future health spending, compared with projected trends. By 2020, the cumulative 
reduction in the growth of national health spending would be distributed across the major 
groups that pay for health care: the federal, state, and local governments; private 
employers; and households (Exhibit 13). 
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Exhibit 13. Net Cumulative Impact on National Health Expenditures,
2010–2020 Compared with Baseline,
Three Insurance Exchange Scenarios, by Major Payer Groups
Dollars in billions
Note: A negative number indicates spending increases compared with projected expenditures;
a positive indicates spending decreases (i.e., savings).
Data: Estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund.
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Impact on the federal budget. Over the period from 2010 through 2020, the 
cumulative net increase in federal budget outlays is estimated to be $112 billion with the 
Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path, $232 billion under the Public Plan with 
Intermediate Payment Rates path, and $360 billion with the Private Plans path (Exhibit 
13). The federal budget costs of covering the uninsured and providing premium 
assistance to low-to-moderate-income working families are greatest when these groups 
are covered by private plans paying commercial provider payment rates and least when 
they are covered by a public plan paying at Medicare rates. Under each scenario, most of 
the federal budget costs are incurred in the first five years. 
 
Costs to the federal government, as the central source of financing for coverage 
expansions, would increase during the early years as the government invests in system 
reform and extends affordable coverage to all. The insurance design specified for 
modeling also provides federal funding to offset state and local costs of expanding 
Medicaid and raising Medicaid payment rates to Medicare levels, thus increasing net 
federal government spending. With system reform policies in place, however, the net 
federal cost of insurance expansion and investing in the care system declines rapidly. By 
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2020, payment and system reform savings would offset nearly all the increase in annual 
federal spending compared with baseline projections (Exhibit 14). In 2020, there would 
be a net reduction in federal government outlays under all three scenarios: $58 billion 
under the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates scenario, $26 billion under the 
Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates scenario, and $26 billion under the Private 
Plans scenario. 
 
 
Exhibit 14. Change in Net Federal Spending Under Three Path Scenarios
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Household savings. Most of the savings would accrue to individuals and families 
as a result of slower growth in premiums and out-of-pocket spending, federal premium 
assistance, and expansion of public programs to make insurance affordable. The savings 
would be realized by all income groups, including higher-income households (Exhibit 15). 
By 2020, these savings would average $2,228 per household with the Public Plan with 
Medicare Payment Rates path, $1,634 with the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment 
Rates path, and $1,576 with the Private Plans path. Total savings to households over the 
2010–2020 period under the three scenarios are estimated to be $2.1 trillion, $1.6 trillion, 
and $1.5 trillion, respectively (Exhibit 13). 
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Exhibit 15. Average Annual Savings per Family
Under Three Reform Scenarios, 2020
Data: Estimates by the Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund.
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Employers. Employers in all three scenarios are required to cover workers or 
contribute 7 percent of workers’ earnings up to $1.25 an hour to a health insurance fund. 
As a result, employers that do not now cover their employees would bear added cost. 
However, employers that now cover their workers would benefit from insurance, payment, 
and system reforms that lower insurance premiums and slow future growth in health care 
costs. Employers would fare best when their employees have access to a public health 
insurance plan that provides value for the premium dollar. Over the period 2010–2020, 
payment and system savings under the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates 
scenario would offset any additional costs that health reform might produce for employers 
and workers, as slower premium growth results in net cumulative employer savings of 
$78 billion, although the effects on different employers would vary (Exhibit 13). 
Employers would incur $163 billion in increased costs under the Public Plan with 
Intermediate Payment Rates scenario and $579 billion under the Private Plans scenario 
over the 2010–2020 period. 
 
Across the three Path scenarios, employers and workers would gain from having 
access to a public plan with provider payment rates comparable to Medicare levels or 
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even at a midpoint between Medicare and commercial rates. These savings greatly 
diminish without the public plan option. 
 
State and local governments. State and local governments would also realize 
substantial savings relative to current projections, ranging from $921 billion under the 
Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path and $765 billion under the Public Plan 
with Intermediate Payment Rates path to $594 billion under the Private Plans path 
(Exhibit 13). The savings accrue primarily from slower growth in national health costs as 
a result of payment and system reforms. 
 
Implications for Complexity and Insurance Administrative Overhead 
The insurance exchange reduces administrative complexity, making it easy for 
individuals to compare plans and premiums, select and enroll in a plan, and change or 
keep coverage. Use of the exchange and system reforms also reduce insurance-related 
administrative costs. Assuming the exchange would offer more standardized benefits to 
enable transparent, informed choices and provide a Web portal to help enrollees compare 
plans based on quality and price, it has the potential to reduce marketing as well as 
underwriting costs and costs related to churning. The public plan would also reduce 
overhead costs and provide a benchmark for competitors that includes low or no 
marketing costs, lower margins, and retention of premium surpluses as reserves. 
 
In all three Path scenarios, small businesses and individuals stand to gain the most 
from greater efficiencies in insurance markets, as administrative costs now represent on 
average 41 percent of claims in the individual market and 15 percent to 36 percent of 
claims for small businesses with fewer than 100 employees (Exhibit 16). Under all 
scenarios, private plans offered through the exchange to individuals and small groups 
could have much lower administrative costs than they do now as a result of reduced 
churning, lower marketing costs, and elimination of the costs of underwriting for health 
risks (Exhibit 17). 
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Exhibit 16. Cost of Administering Health Insurance as a Percentage of 
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Overall, the exchange is expected to incur administrative expenses of 4.5 percent 
of average premiums in addition to administrative costs within health plans. Thus, it is 
essential that market reforms assure reduced costs within plans to hold the line on 
overhead expenses. 
 
The public plan is estimated to have administrative expenses of 3.5 percent to  
4 percent, similar to large-group risk pools. Including the costs of operating the exchange, 
the premium for the public plan would incur administrative costs of 8 percent. These 
costs would likely be lower than the average for private plans. Some of the advantages of 
the public plan include the absence of expenses for commissions, advertising, and 
markups for returns to investors. With a large risk pool, the public plan would hold its 
own reserves and earn the return on reserves similar to arrangements made for federal 
employees and large firms. The public plan would contract with private companies to 
administer claims. 
 
About $265 billion in insurance administrative savings are projected over 2010–
2020 in the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path, compared with $223 billion 
in the Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path and an extra cost of $32 billion 
in the Private Plans path. These figures reflect the added costs of operating the insurance 
exchange as well as the effect of the expansion of private plan enrollment in offsetting 
the reduction in administrative costs per person through the insurance exchange. 
 
If the insurance market reforms included more standardized reporting, coding, and 
quality metrics plus electronic billing of claims and more standardized benefit designs, 
they have the potential to reduce insurance-related administrative costs for physicians and 
hospitals as well as health plans. Recent studies estimate physician practices spend  
$31 billion—the equivalent of 10 percent to 12 percent of total practice revenue—on 
billing and insurance-related administrative costs, which include 3 weeks a year of 
physician time per practitioner.11 Hospitals spend 6 percent to 10 percent on just these 
two items of insurance-related administrative activities. If standardization could cut such 
insurance-related overhead in half, there would be $15 billion to $20 billion in savings 
per year for physicians and $25 billion to $40 billion in savings per year for hospitals.12
 
Implications for Providers 
The modeling estimates that such integrated policies would slow expenditure growth 
from a projected 6.5 percent annually to 5.2 percent in the Public Plan with Medicare 
Payment Rates path, 5.6 percent in Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path, 
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and 5.8 percent in the Private Plans path (Exhibit 3). All of these reductions are less than 
the 1.5-percentage-point growth-reduction goal endorsed by industry groups. 
 
While significantly slower than projected growth, revenues for hospitals, 
physicians, and other providers would continue to grow each year. In early years, 
providers would be receiving substantial inflows of revenues for care of the uninsured 
and improved payment rates under Medicaid. Improved benefits for those currently 
underinsured would also reduce bad debts. Covering the uninsured and improving the 
coverage offered them is expected to generate $32 billion to $50 billion in new annual 
revenues as the uninsured gain access to needed care and can afford to pay for it. Raising 
Medicaid payment rates to Medicare rates would generate an additional $30 billion per 
year. As a result of upgrades in payments by public payers and coverage of the uninsured, 
most hospitals and physicians would see an increase in revenues in the early years. 
Increasing Medicaid payment rates to Medicare levels would enhance access for patients 
and provide direct support to safety-net hospitals and clinics and other providers who 
care for low-income families. 
 
These increases provide enhanced revenues to most providers in the early years, 
and in the aggregate they offset any reduced revenue from enrollees switching their 
insurance from private to public plans that pay providers at reduced rates. In the early 
years, projected revenues are thus similar to ones predicted by current trends. Different 
providers will be affected differently, however, depending on the insurance status of the 
mix of patients. 
 
Most importantly, providers as a whole would experience growing revenues 
generated by continued medical advances and an aging population. Hospital revenues 
would increase from $789 billion in 2009 to between $1.33 trillion and $1.44 trillion in 
2020, depending on the scenario—a growth of 68 percent to 82 percent over the baseline 
level (Exhibit 18). Similarly, physician revenues would increase from $710 billion in 
2009 to between $1.07 trillion and $1.16 trillion in 2020—a growth of 51 percent to  
64 percent over 2009 levels (Exhibit 19). Individual providers could experience greater  
or lesser growth, but nearly all should be able to adjust over time, given the underlying 
growth in demand for services. 
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Payment reforms would be intended to support and provide incentives for 
innovations in practices and more productive use of resources. The new public plan 
would include needed reforms in payment methods, as would Medicare. Critical areas for 
improvement include: 
 
• Increasing payments for primary care services; 
• Updating the relative value scale to adjust for overvalued services based on profit 
margins and rapid growth in volume; 
• Introducing new options for payment of primary care practices serving as medical 
homes, with capacity to provide 24/7 access, coordinate care, and manage chronic 
conditions; and 
• Developing more “bundled” payment approaches and shared savings arrangements 
with care systems to reward and support high-quality, efficient care. 
 
In addition, fundamental payment reform that aligns incentives across all payers 
could eliminate many of the pricing complications that now exist and lend coherence to 
the incentives providers face. Currently, not only are there wide discrepancies in payment 
rates between public and private payers but private insurance rates vary widely for the 
same care within communities. One observer noted that a close look revealed “chaos” 
rather than any rational purchasing or payment policies.13 Moreover, recent media 
accounts indicate that suppliers and medical care providers may be increasing prices now 
in anticipation of reforms.14
 
Implications for Population Health 
Changing the way we pay for care to align incentives with value is critical. The payment 
reforms in the Path framework would enhance the value of primary care and change the 
way we pay to stimulate care delivery through patient-centered medical homes which 
have the capacity to provide access, coordinate care, and use information systems and 
teams in managing chronic conditions. Moving to more bundled payments, with 
provisions for accountability for outcomes, would align incentives with the value rather 
than the volume of care delivered and would support hospitals, physicians, and other 
clinicians working together to care for patients. Building a solid infrastructure of 
information systems and programs to enhance prevention of disease and promote 
population health would encourage innovation in the effort to meet current and future 
community health needs. 
 
 29
The health reform framework that underlies all of the paths examined here 
envisions a health system that provides patients with personal sources of care who know 
their medical history, that ensures timely access, that helps coordinate care, and that uses 
essential clinical information to provide the right care, with an emphasis on health and 
disease prevention. Payment and information systems would stimulate and support a 
patient-centered care system that is coordinated, accessible, and safe. 
 
With a focus on prevention and improving outcomes for chronic disease, the 
nation could achieve substantial improvements in population health, relying on policies 
that align incentives with the provision of good care and prudent use of resources, 
provide clinicians with information system tools and decision support, and build and 
expand public health programs. We should aim for healthier, more productive lives 
through prevention of disease, earlier intervention, and effective management of chronic 
conditions, particularly for people with multiple comorbidities. In addition, more 
effective and humane care for those with late-stage diseases could address the huge 
variations in care. 
 
All three paths described here include a major investment in population health. 
New federal taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and sugared soft drinks will generate $382 billion 
in revenues over the 11-year, 2010–2020 period under all three scenarios. Many of these 
revenues will be reinvested in state and local public health initiatives. 
 
By setting targets and implementing policies that meet and raise benchmarks of 
top performance, we have the opportunity to save lives, improve the quality of life and 
care experience, lower safety risks to patients, and prevent the onset of disease and 
complications. As illustrated by key indicators from the Commonwealth Fund 
Commission’s National Scorecard on U.S. Health System Performance, improving 
average performance by 2020 to targets or benchmarks set by current top performers 
would achieve substantial gains in population health and patient experiences (Exhibit 20). 
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Exhibit 20. Achieving Benchmarks:
Potential People Impact if the United States Improved
National Performance to the Level of the Benchmark
180,000 increase98%28%Percent of primary care doctors with electronic medical records
100,000 decrease69110Deaths before age 75 from conditions amenable to health care,per 100,000 population
640,000 decrease465700Medicare admissions to hospital for ambulatory care-sensitive conditions, per 100,000 beneficiaries (age 65 and older)
70,000 decrease49156Pediatric admissions to hospital for asthma, per 100,000 children(ages 2–17)
250,000 decrease126240Admissions to hospital for diabetes complications, per 100,000 adults (age 18 and older)
180,000 decrease14%18%Percent of Medicare beneficiaries (age 65 and older)readmitted to hospital within 30 days
5 million increase70%58%Percent of adult hospital stays (age 18 and older) in whichhospital staff always explained medicines and side effects
10 million increase60%46%Percent of children (ages 0–17) with a medical home
37 million increase85%65%Percent of adults (ages 19–64) with an accessible primary care provider
68 million increase80%50%Percent of adults (age 18 and older) receivingall recommended preventive care
73 million increase99%58%Percent of adults (ages 19–64) insured, not underinsured
Impact on
number of people
2020
target*
Current
national
average
* Targets are benchmarks of top 10% performance within the U.S. or top countries
(mortality amenable and electronic medical records). All preventive care is a target.
Source: Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System, Why Not the Best? Results from 
the National Scorecard on U.S. Health System Performance, 2008 (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, July 2008), 
with benchmarks from top performance.
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CONCLUSION 
Though they are built on the same framework, the three alternatives examined here 
represent a three-pronged fork in the road, offering very different paths to a higher-
performance, higher-value health system. Exhibit 21 compares their overall strengths to 
current markets and policies. 
 
 
Exhibit 21. Net Impact of Insurance Exchange Options on
Federal Budget and National Health Expenditures, 2010–2020
Note: 0 = no significant improvement; + slight improvement; ++ = moderate improvement; +++ = large improvement.
Data: Estimates by the Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund.
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The Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates path envisions a rapid 
transformation of the payment system by establishing a strong public purchaser which 
could rapidly spread innovative provider payment reforms that reward value, not volume. 
This strong competitor could provide a catalyst for the private market to innovate—with 
competition based on beneficiary experiences with access, quality of care, and premium 
costs. Innovative payment methods would be incorporated in the public plan offered 
through the national health insurance exchange, Medicare, and Medicaid, representing 
substantial leverage of purchasing power on behalf of the population to transform the 
health system. Providers would have major incentives to drive high-value care and would 
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immediately be eligible for shared savings, if they are able to transform care to reduce 
avoidable hospitalization and hospital readmissions. 
 
The public insurance plan could also provide a safeguard against undue use of 
market power in either insurance or provider markets. As a major efficient purchaser, it 
would have the leverage to trigger a new market dynamic. With standardization as well 
as more consolidated risk pools, the public plan options offer the potential for substantial 
reduction in administrative waste for both insurers and providers. With enriched choice in 
the insurance exchange, including a stable nationwide public plan, businesses, workers, 
and individuals would have substantially expanded choices of plans and the opportunity 
to stay with a plan if it works well for them. 
 
The Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates path would also achieve 
significant savings and major reforms, although less rapidly. This “slower” start on cost 
containment and the decision to offer a new public plan with a premium based on 
provider payment above Medicare levels and midway toward commercial provider-
payment levels results in smaller health system savings—$2.0 trillion—and smaller 
savings for employers and workers. At $232 billion, the net increase in federal budget 
costs is also greater than under the Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates approach. 
 
The Private Plans approach (with otherwise similar reforms) would cover nearly 
all of the uninsured while achieving total health system savings but at a much slower 
pace of cost reduction and with higher net federal budget costs. As modeled, this 
approach does not require incorporation of new innovative payment reforms in private 
plans, as payment reforms would be adopted by Medicare and Medicaid and already 
generate savings to government budgets. With private markets left to develop on their 
own and no benchmark or new competitor to stimulate change, and public programs 
continuing in a separate realm with different payment rates and methods, providers are 
unlikely to realize administrative savings. Further, administrative costs under private 
plans will remain high without the spur to compete against a public plan. Nonetheless, 
total health spending growth would slow to 5.8 percent per year, with cumulative health 
system savings of $1.2 trillion over 11 years, assuming implementation of coverage, 
payment, and system reforms. The costs of insurance expansion with lower system 
savings to offset federal outlays would result in a net increase in federal budget costs of 
$360 billion over the 2010–2020 period. 
 
In any of the three approaches described here, both public payers (either with or 
without a public plan) and private insurers should be able to step up to the plate and 
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change the way that they operate and pay for care and so encourage and reward better 
performance within the health system. Public payers need to move away from fee-for-
service toward more bundled payments which pay for coordinated patient care and better 
outcomes rather than for the volume and intensity of services provided. Among private 
insurers, the dominant carriers get price discounts and enjoy substantial purchasing power 
in some markets. Reforms could require that their operations become more transparent, 
with carriers disclosing prices paid and overhead costs, including medical loss ratios and 
margins. And private insurers could standardize and simplify coverage to reduce 
wasteful, complex administrative burdens for doctors, hospitals, and patients.15 The 
nation urgently needs accountable insurance and insurers—whatever the sponsorship—
that put patients’ and families’ health first, pool risks to provide financial protection, and 
serve as agents of the population in paying for care. A level playing field means raising, 
not lowering, standards. 
 
In short, the presence of the public plan, and the payment policies that it adopts, 
account for most of the total health system savings and federal budget cost differences 
among the alternative scenarios. Differing results reflect the relative aggressiveness and 
effectiveness of cost-containment strategies and the creation of a new dynamic which can 
transform both health insurance and the provision of health care. The choice of a public 
plan provides a less expensive base for expanding coverage, because the public plan 
would, at least initially, be paying at lower rates than private plans currently pay (but at 
higher rates than most providers now receive for uninsured and Medicaid patients). The 
public plan would also enable more rapid spread of payment reforms, because more 
people would be covered under plans that adopt the reforms. And the public plan 
achieves economies through lower insurance administrative costs. Although difficult to 
predict, private plans, too, could be expected to respond to this new competitive dynamic 
by partnering with accountable-care organizations and integrated delivery systems to 
provide incentives and tools for more effective care and the elimination of ineffective, 
avoidable, or duplicative care, while achieving economies in insurance administration. 
 
Although spending growth would slow, most providers would experience rising 
revenues and opportunities for shared savings as preventable hospitalization and greater 
efficiency of treatment are realized. Coverage of the uninsured and improved benefits 
would sharply reduce uncompensated care and infuse new revenues into the health 
system in the early years, benefiting in particular safety-net providers that now provide 
the bulk of care to people who cannot pay. 
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Having arrived at a critical fork in the road, the national reform debate has 
centered on which road to follow. At this moment, the label “public” or “private” has 
become a focal point, rather than the urgent goals of reform itself. However health care 
coverage is provided, reforms should ensure that everyone has the benefit of insurance 
plans that serve as agents for the public by pooling risk, paying for effective care, and 
being accountable for outcomes. The key issue should be how best to provide access to 
high-quality, affordable care for all, now and into the future. 
 
Those are the goals of comprehensive health reform, and we should not lose sight 
of them. Achieving such goals requires bending the health care cost curve in a way that 
best improves quality, eliminates waste, and enhances value. All three paths described 
here, combined with an integrated set of Medicare payment and system reforms, would 
take major steps toward the goal of covering the uninsured. But with the nation’s 
economic and fiscal future at risk, health reform must pay particular attention to effective 
strategies for altering the future course of spending for health care and increasing the 
value obtained for the resources devoted to the health system. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Policies Included in the Three Insurance Scenarios: 
Modeling Specifications for Coverage and Cost Estimates 
 
 
COVERAGE 
• Three Path Insurance Scenarios: 
- Public Plan with Medicare Payment Rates: A new public insurance choice 
would be offered through the national health insurance exchange. It would 
include benefits similar to the standard-option Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program (FEHBP). The public plan would use Medicare’s private 
claims administrative organizations and reformed payment methods and rates. 
- Public Plan with Intermediate Payment Rates: This approach would include a 
new public health insurance plan with reformed payment methods and payment 
rates set between Medicare and commercial levels. The public plan and private 
plans would be subject to the same market rules governing choice of plans. 
- Private Plans: No public health insurance plan is offered in the exchange, but 
all other policies are the same. Private plans include insurance products that 
pay providers on a discounted fee-for-service basis as well as community 
health plans partnering with integrated delivery systems. 
 
• National Health Insurance Exchange. Offers businesses and individuals a 
structured choice of plans, phased in by the size of the firm with all persons eligible 
by 2014. Premiums for all plans would be community-rated within broad age bands. 
National minimum standards for benefits are similar to the standard option in 
FEHBP. The exchange would replace individual insurance markets.* 
 
• Insurance Market Reforms. Require community-rated premiums (age bands 
permitted up to a 2-to-1 ratio) and guarantee issue and renewal of policies. Establish a 
minimum national standard for benefits. Comparative premium and insurance-
performance information would be publicly available on the Web. 
 
• Individual Mandate. Everyone would be required to have coverage. 
                                                 
* Note that this is a change from the original Path framework. 
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• Affordability. Federal assistance to cap premiums at 5 percent of income for 
households in the two lowest income tax brackets; 10 percent of income for those in 
the 25 percent tax bracket; 12 percent for those in the 28 percent tax bracket, and no 
premium cap for those in the 33 percent and 35 percent tax brackets. Premium 
assistance is available only through the exchange. Premium assistance would be 
pegged to the most efficient plan. 
 
• Employer Shared Financial Responsibility. Employers are required to provide 
coverage or contribute to a trust fund. The example used in the model included  
7 percent of payroll, up to $1.25 an hour. 
 
• Medicaid/CHIP Expansion. All individuals with incomes up to 150 percent of the 
federal poverty income level are eligible for Medicaid acute-care benefits. Medicaid 
provider payment rates are raised to Medicare levels. The federal matching rate is 
increased to offset state costs. 
 
• Medicare. The two-year waiting period for coverage of the disabled is eliminated. 
 
PAYMENT REFORM: ALIGNING INCENTIVES TO ENHANCE VALUE 
• Enhance Payment for Primary Care. Increase Medicare payments for primary care 
by 5 percent and apply differential updates for primary and other care. 
• Encourage Development and Spread of Patient-Centered Medical Homes. 
Provide $8 per month payment per patient in addition to fee-for-service to practices 
qualified to provide patient-centered care. Make reduced premiums and cost-sharing 
available to patients who designate a primary-care practice as their medical home. 
Shared savings would be distributed on the basis of provider performance. 
• Bundled Payments for Acute-Care Episodes. Expand acute-care payment to 
include services during the hospital stay and 30 days post-discharge in a global fee. 
The policy would be phased in, starting with inpatient services in 2010, followed by 
post-acute care in 2013 and hospital inpatient and outpatient physician care in 2016. 
Over time, hospitals would be eligible for shared savings distributed on the basis of 
performance. Annual productivity gains of one percentage point would be incorporated. 
• Correcting Price Signals. Modify payments by: 1) slowing the rate of Medicare 
payment updates in geographic areas with high costs; 2) reducing prescription drug 
costs by having Medicare pay Medicaid prices for drugs used by dually eligible 
beneficiaries as well as determining Medicare payments for unique drugs with 
effective monopolies based on prices paid in other countries; and 3) resetting 
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benchmarks for Medicare Advantage plans in each county to projected per capita 
spending under traditional Medicare. 
 
INVESTING IN INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
• Accelerate the Adoption and Use of Health Information Technology. Require all 
providers to report key health outcomes electronically by 2015 to qualify for payment 
updates. Provide funding to support health information networks and assistance for 
safety-net providers and small practices through a 1 percent assessment on insurance 
premiums and Medicare outlays. 
• Center for Medical Effectiveness and Health Care Decision-Making. Create a 
mechanism to develop information on the clinical outcome and cost-effectiveness of 
alternative treatment options. Fund the Center with a .05 percent assessment on 
insurance premiums and Medicare and Medicaid spending. Use the information in 
benefit designs with higher out-of-pocket costs or differential pricing depending on 
comparative effectiveness and include physician–patient shared decision-making. 
PROMOTING HEALTH AND DISEASE PREVENTION 
• Reduce Tobacco Use. Increase federal taxes on tobacco products by $2 per pack of 
cigarettes. Use revenues to fund public health programs and insurance expansion. 
• Reduce Obesity and Alcohol Use. Establish a new tax on sugar-sweetened soft 
drinks of 1 cent per 12 ounces to finance state obesity-prevention programs and 
increase the federal excise tax on alcohol by 5 cents per 12-ounce can of beer, with 
proportionate increases on other alcohol products. Use funds for prevention measures 
and insurance expansion. 
 
 
Methodology Note 
Modeling each option required detailed specifications for each policy. These specifications were 
prepared by the authors for illustrative purposes. Estimates are based on modeling by The 
Lewin Group, a health consulting firm with more than 35 years of experience serving organizations 
in the public, nonprofit, and private sectors. The Lewin Group is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Ingenix, which in turn is owned by UnitedHealth Group. The Lewin Group maintains editorial 
independence from its owners and is responsible for the integrity of data that it produces for 
the Fund. The Lewin Group technical report, The Path to a High Performance U.S. Health System: 
Technical Documentation, is available online at www.Lewin.com for parameters used in modeling. 
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